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The case of tax collection
in Zambia
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Email : soest@giga-hamburg.de
A B S T R A C T
Following the neopatrimonialism paradigm, it can be hypothesised that in
African states informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection of taxes
and in turn reduce state revenue. This article tests this proposition for the
case of Zambia. Neopatrimonial continuity in the country is evidenced by three
factors : the concentration of political power, the award of personal favours, and
the misuse of state resources. Despite this continuity, the revenue performance
increased considerably with the creation of the semi-autonomous Zambia
Revenue Authority. Donor pressure has been the most important intervening
variable accounting for this improvement. Yet, strengthening the collection of
central state revenue has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale, and
may even have fed neopatrimonialism overall, by providing increased resources
for particularistic expenditure.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Proponents of the concept of neopatrimonialism assert that distinct
features distinguish governance in the African state from its counterparts
in other world regions (Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Chabal & Daloz
1999; Englebert 2000; Me´dard 1982; van de Walle 2001a). It is postulated
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that the particular nature of the African state, characterised by the lack
of separation between the public and the private sphere, fundamentally
inhibits state capability on the continent.
The inability to collect taxes,1 which commonly form the ﬁnancial basis
for all other state functions (e.g. internal and external security, public
welfare), is one of the most fundamental deﬁcits in this respect (Bra¨utigam
2002: 14; Olowu 2003: 105; van de Walle 2001a: 182–3). An IMF study
(Silvani & Baer 1997: 6–7) found that in some African countries, more
than 60% of the tax potential remains untapped. The neopatrimonial
perspective implies that this must be attributed not only to Africa’s low
socio-economic status, but also to political interference with the process of
collecting state revenue. This article seeks to test this premise in respect to
Zambia, a country whose political practice – as in other African states – is
assumed to be characterised by neopatrimonialism.2
Since colonial times, Zambia’s state ﬁnances have been based on the
extraction of copper. The sharp decline of world market prices for the
mineral resource in the mid-1970s caused a severe economic and revenue
crisis. By 2000, real GDP per capita had declined to only about 55% of its
1975 level (World Bank 2003: 112). Up to the 2005 Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) debt relief, Zambia had been one of the most heavily
indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa (IMF 2005b). Thus, Zambia has
a long history of interaction with multilateral and bilateral donors. These
have potentially exerted a strong leverage on domestic politics.
Accordingly, donor inﬂuence is the key intervening variable incorporated
into this analysis on the eﬀects of neopatrimonialism on the collection of
central state taxes in Zambia.
Despite the need for new sources of state income, the single-party
government of President Kaunda refrained from strengthening domestic
tax collection. Only after the reintroduction of the multiparty system in
1991 and the electoral success of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy
(MMD), did the new government radically strengthen the tax adminis-
tration, with the creation of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue
Authority (ZRA). Yet, the indicators show that Zambia’s political elite has
resorted to neopatrimonial practices largely unabated. The country
therefore constitutes a particularly interesting case study for analysing
neopatrimonialism and its eﬀects on the collection of state revenue in the
African state.
Over 75 qualitative interviews conducted in Zambia allow for ‘process
tracing’, and provide most of this study’s empirical value added. Six re-
spondent groups from inside as well as outside the tax administration were
interviewed.3 In addition, primary sources such as the tax administration’s
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annual reports and the budget speeches were systematically analysed. In
order to focus on analysis of Zambia’s tax administration, this study deals
only with the collection of central state taxes. Local taxes and their
administration operate under speciﬁc conditions distinct from the central
level. Furthermore, they play a minor role in Zambia (Gloppen & Rakner
2002: 35; NORAD 2002: 7). Nor does the analysis include the collection of
non-tax revenue, fees or service charges by other authorities or ministries.4
Reference is made to the collection of these other forms of state revenue
where appropriate.
The analysis puts forward three main arguments. First, Zambia’s 1991
transition from the one-party state to the multiparty system completely
changed the impact of neopatrimonialism on tax collection. As the most
crucial intervening variable, donor inﬂuence made the strengthening of
domestic revenue generation a precondition for the resumption of oﬃcial
development aid to the country after the transition. Second, the reform of
Zambia’s tax administration has been consistent with a neopatrimonial
rationale. Favours could still be awarded through state expenditure, tax
exemptions and the eﬀective non-taxation of the large informal sector.
The larger consequences of the institutional reform of the Zambia Rev-
enue Authority for how tax revenues are spent remain negligible. Third,
there are indications that the heavily donor-supported Zambia Revenue
Authority has provided additional resources for neopatrimonial exchange
relations. Thus, it might have strengthened neopatrimonialism overall.
The article starts by conceptualising the main facets of neopa-
trimonialism. It then introduces indicators to operationalise and analyse
neopatrimonialism in Zambia. Finally, it assesses the eﬀects of neopa-
trimonialism on the collection of revenue.
C O N C E P T U A L I S I N G N E O P A T R I M O N I A L I S M
Neopatrimonialism is a ‘universal concept’ which its proponents perceive
to have particular value for explaining Africa’s state weaknesses, demo-
cratic deﬁciencies and economic crisis. Bratton and van de Walle (1997:
277), for instance, maintain that ‘ the distinctive institutional hallmark
of African regimes is neopatrimonialism’. The basic proposition of this
heuristic concept is that informal, particularistic politics of the rulers
pervade formal state institutions. The separation between the public and
the private realm, which stands at the basis of the ‘modern’ conception of
the state, is abrogated.5
Principally, the term neopatrimonialism denotes the simultaneous op-
eration of the two Weberian ideal types of patrimonial and rational-legal
T A X CO L L E C T I O N I N Z AM B I A 623
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Jan 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
domination (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62; Clapham 1985: 48).
Patrimonialism connotes that a patron in a certain social and political
order bestows gifts from own resources on followers in order to secure
their loyalty and support (Weber 1980 [1922] : 133–4, 136). Clients, in turn,
obtain material beneﬁts and protection. In a neopatrimonial system, pa-
trons are typically oﬃce-holders in state institutions who misuse public
funds or oﬃce in order to stay in power. Social practice as a result is funda-
mentally diﬀerent from the impersonal formal rules which are supposed to
guide oﬃcial action (Alence 2004: 165; Erdmann & Engel 2007: 20).
In the case of tax collection, it can be hypothesised that neopa-
trimonialism leads to political interference with the tax administration and
in turn reduces state revenue.6 Donors as well as researchers regard these
organisations as focal points of interference from the political sphere (Gill
2003: 1 ; Rose-Ackerman 2004: 28; World Bank 2002: 111). Two prime
forms of undue inﬂuence from the political sphere are possible : ﬁrst, the
placement of unqualiﬁed top-, middle- and low-level tax oﬃcers, who ﬁll
patronage positions. Second, neopatrimonial interference with the tax
administration’s day-to-day business in order to prevent audits at busi-
nesses that enjoy political protection, inhibit controls at border posts, and
harass opponents of the neopatrimonial ‘big man’. Both strategies serve
the political interest of securing authority and the private interest of re-
ducing tax payments. They keep the tax administration weak, and in turn
signiﬁcantly reduce the room for self-suﬃciently ﬁnancing the African
state.
Reading the vast array of literature on neopatrimonialism in sub-
Saharan Africa, it is striking that widely accepted indicators for this
practice are non-existent, and systematic analyses of its eﬀects on public
policy are rare (one exception is Kjaer 2004). The key methodological
aim of this article is therefore to contribute to the systematic oper-
ationalisation of the concept. In accordance with Bratton and van de
Walle (1997 : 63–8), it applies the three features ‘systematic concentration
of political power’, ‘award of personal favours ’, and ‘misuse of state re-
sources for political legitimation’ for assessing the neopatrimonial proﬁle
of Zambia. Such analysis provides strong indicators of the character of the
Zambian state, and reveals the continuity of neopatrimonial practices in
the country.
N E O P A T R I M O N I A L I S M I N Z A M B I A
Since independence, Zambia’s rulers have consistently applied all three
features of neopatrimonial politics.
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Concentration of political power
Concentration of political power implies the dominance of one individual,
‘who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks ’
(Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 63).7 As a deﬁning feature of this ‘big
man politics ’, the president or, in other words, the patron, stays in power
for a long time, sometimes until the end of his life. Indeed, presidents in
sub-Saharan Africa on average oﬃciate signiﬁcantly longer than their
counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Bienen & van de Walle 1992:
693). Young (1994: x) consequently speaks of ‘ ‘‘ life president ’’ power
management’. On the other hand, neopatrimonial rulers frequently
rotate the political elite in order to prevent any potential opponent from
developing his or her own power base, and also in order to extend the
clientelist network (Snyder 1992: 392; Snyder & Mahoney 1999: 108–9).
The simultaneous fulﬁlment of both requirements, a long tenure of presi-
dents and a short tenure of key government members, therefore suggests a
neopatrimonial power concentration.
This has been exactly the case in Zambia. With Kenneth Kaunda,
Frederick Chiluba and Levy Mwanawasa, the country has seen only three
presidents since independence in 1964. Their average length of tenure
amounts to 14 years,8 which stands above the 11.6 years African state
leaders have on average managed to stay in power from 1980 to 2005
(van de Walle 2005: 74).
The ﬁrst President, Kaunda, served for 27 years in oﬃce and en-
trenched his power with a corps of personal advisors, which in turn
reduced the inﬂuence of the cabinet and other units of the ruling United
National Independence Party (UNIP). He not only gained from particular
legitimacy as Zambia’s founding President who had led the struggle for
independence, but also augmented his control of the political process by
promulgating the one-party state in December 1972 (Scott 1980: 152;
Tordoﬀ & Molteno 1974: 252).
The neopatrimonial centralisation of power in Zambia also ﬁnds
expression in the frequent change of ministers. The average tenure of key
ministers from independence until today stands at only 2.4 years.9
Consequently, the most important cabinet members have exercised their
functions for only half of a legislative period on average. This pattern of
‘elite circulation’ (Burnell 2001b: 241) has shown a high degree of con-
sistency, and has endured during Zambia’s one-party Second Republic
(1972 to 1991), and the multiparty Third Republic (since November 1991).
In a major cabinet reshuﬄe in April 1993, for instance, President
Chiluba removed from oﬃce those reform-minded ministers whom he
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perceived to be a threat to his rule. Others were frustrated to the extent
that they resigned from government (Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 14).
With an average tenure of less than two years, the ‘ministerial game of
musical chairs ’ (Tordoﬀ & Molteno 1974: 254) in the key departments
has not slowed down under the current President Mwanawasa, who was
re-elected on 28 September 2006 (ECZ 2006).
Award of personal favours
Not only do Zambia’s presidents frequently rotate ministers, they also
award personal favours to other elite members in order to secure their
rule. A prime means has been the expansion of the cabinet, which features
prominently among means for awarding personal favours in Africa (van de
Walle 2001b: 32–3). The Zambian cabinet has grown signiﬁcantly over the
years ; from 14 ministers in 1964 to currently 23 members.10 This is
congruent with the trend in many African countries. Van de Walle (2005:
80) shows that the average number of cabinet ministers in the region rose
from 20.1 members in 1979 to 24.6 in 2000.11 As in Zambia, these cabinet
sizes cannot be substantiated by functional necessities. Most developed
countries, having much larger populations and economies, are governed
by cabinets of only 15 to 20 ministers (OECD 2004: 2).
The number of core cabinet ministers only moderately reﬂects the
enlargement of patronage posts in the Zambian government. In 1968,
President Kaunda appointed ministers for each of Zambia’s nine
provinces. After the introduction of the one-party state, the UNIP Central
Committee became a parallel structure to the cabinet (van Donge 1995:
196). The president also created additional posts in order to pursue his
policy of ‘ tribal balancing’ in Zambia’s multi-ethnic society (Carey 2002:
60). Despite the severe and enduring economic crisis, the cabinet went
up to a peak of 27 ministers (1986 to 1988) during the Second Republic.
Furthermore, the ‘UNIP patronage machine’ (Bratton 1994: 104) mas-
sively expanded public sector employment. Following Bates and Collier
(1993: 391), in 1985, the party ﬁlled over 40,000 public oﬃces in Zambia’s
capital Lusaka alone.
After the transition to multiparty rule and the formation of his
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government in 1991,
President Chiluba also formed a large cabinet. He appointed 25 ministers
to the Third Republic’s ﬁrst cabinet ; a number which rose to an all-time
high of 28 posts one year later. Even today the bloated government is
a feature of Zambian politics. A 2004 media campaign to reduce the
number of high-level government posts remained unsuccessful (The Post
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20.4.2004, 26.4.2004). According to a Government of Zambia document
(RoZ 2005), the total number of government members (president, vice-
president, ministers and vice-ministers) on 3 August 2005 stood at 67.
Misuse of state resources
The misuse of state resources, the third feature of neopatrimonialism, has
also characterised Zambia’s political practice. The expenditure side of
the budget is particularly well-suited for analysing the misuse of state
resources. In line with other research, this article also uses the existence
of serious corruption levels as an indicator for the neopatrimonial misuse
of state resources (Basedau 2003: 281–7; Manow 2002: 24–5). It refers to
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the similar World Bank
Governance Index in respect to ‘control of corruption’. Both are com-
posite indices which incorporate various studies on a country’s perceived
corruption levels (Graf Lambsdorﬀ 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2005a).
During the Second Republic, a Leadership Code obliged all cabinet
and Central Committee members to separate public oﬃce and private
interests (Kaunda 1972: par. 4). Yet, the text of the code was not put into
practice. A general pattern emerged of misusing public functions and re-
sources.12 It became apparent that ‘bribes and favours oﬀered a host of
rewards for ‘‘gatekeeping services ’’ ’ (Szeftel 2000: 210). Monitoring insti-
tutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission remained toothless, and
the infrequent exposure of corrupt practices in government did not counter
the systematic misappropriation of public resources (Afronet 2002: 89;
Tordoﬀ & Molteno 1974: 287; van Donge 1995: 198). The party slogan ‘It
Pays to Belong to UNIP’ could be taken literally (Szeftel 2000: 212).
President Chiluba’s government also misused state resources, often to
the advantage of the ruling party MMD (Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 72;
Szeftel 2000: 217).13 According to Transparency International Zambia
(2002: 35–7; 2003: 9–10, 13), a number of ministers were involved in
corruption scandals without being dismissed. Furthermore, Zambia has
since 1998 received low scores on Transparency International’s CPI. The
country has always ranked in the lower half, for most of the time in
the worst third of countries included in the index (ICCR 2005). Zambia’s
‘control of corruption’ marks in the World Bank Governance Index have
been equally low. The country has consistently featured among the third
of countries perceived to be most corrupt (Kaufmann et al. 2005b).
Under President Chiluba, a similar ‘blurring of the line’ (Rakner &
Sva˚sand 2005: 95) between the governing party and the state took place as
in the Second Republic. Before the 1996 elections, the government sold
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council houses to tenants on favourable conditions. Commentators largely
perceived this move as an inducement to vote for the MMD (Bratton &
Posner 1999: 397; Financial Mail 27.8.–2.9.2002). President Chiluba also
introduced the oﬃce of district administrator. These local-level positions
were ﬁlled with political appointees who were accountable only to
the president (Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 48; Meyns 2005: 48). In 1999,
the government created a ‘Presidential Discretionary Fund’, unoﬃcially
called ‘Slush Fund’, to distribute favours to clients. The fund’s reserved
budgetary allocations of around 12 billion Kwacha per annum (roughly
US$5 million at that time), were at the disposal of the President alone, who
apparently deployed it for partisan purposes (Burnell 2001b: 251; Simon
2005: 209).
In the face of these developments, President Mwanawasa began his
tenure on 2 January 2002 by declaring his administration to be ‘a
government of laws not of men’. One of the centrepieces of his ‘new deal ’
government was the proclaimed ﬁght against corruption (Erdmann &
Simutanyi 2003: 78; Simon 2005: 212). He lifted the immunity of former
President Chiluba, and charged him and some of his allies with abuse of
oﬃce. However, there are strong indications that Mwanawasa’s campaign
has remained inconsequential and is primarily used as a way of silencing
his opponents (EIU 2005: 16; TIZ 2002: 30).
Furthermore, donor reports have repeatedly criticised the lack of bud-
get discipline and the continued misuse of state resources (see detailed
analyses in Burnell 2001a; TIZ 2003, 2004; World Bank 2003, 2004). In
fact, the reform of Zambia’s public expenditure management has been
one of the centrepieces of current donor assistance in order to address ‘ the
various weaknesses in expenditure control ’ (World Bank 2003: xv). One
prominent reform programme has been the Medium Term Expenditure
Framework (MTEF), which forms part of the Public Sector Reform
Programme for Zambia. The World Bank report (ibid. : 29, xxi) on public
expenditure management found ‘a pattern of failed budgeting’, and
stated that ‘ the most important recommendations … are not technical
ones, but rather those that require a policy decision to be implemented’.
This indicates lack of political will to strengthen expenditure control.14
Consequently, the reform of the expenditure management has remained
particularly unsuccessful. In other words : ‘Problems in budget execution
and budget control lie at the root of Zambia’s ﬁscal failure in the
past decade’ (ibid. : 58). The MMD government’s privatisation of state
assets created even more routes for the misuse of state resources. Most
prominent in this regard was the privatisation of the Zambia Consolidate
Copper Mines (ZCCM) in March 2000 (see analysis in TIZ 2001).
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On balance, neopatrimonialism has characterised political practice in
Zambia since independence in 1964. Due to its inherent lack of account-
ability, the single-party state in the Second Republic reinforced the
neopatrimonial impulse (Bratton 1994: 125). Yet, it is striking to see
the continued application of these practices throughout the Third
Republic, after the abolition of single-party rule. This deeply ingrained
system has created a hostile environment for a rational-legal tax admin-
istration and the collection of revenue.
N E O P A T R I M O N I A L I S M A N D T H E C O L L E C T I O N O F R E V E N U E
The institutional development of Zambia’s tax administration is charac-
terised by two phases. The ﬁrst lasted from independence in 1964 to 1994,
when the Departments of Taxes and of Customs and Excise were integral
parts of the state structure. The second began on 1 April 1994, when the
government launched the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). With this
semi-autonomous agency, it outsourced the collection of revenue from the
traditional public administration under the direct control of the Ministry
of Finance.
In accordance with the discussion of neopatrimonialism above, this
article uses two indicators for analysing the eﬀect of Zambia’s neopa-
trimonial system on tax administration: (a) merit orientation of staﬀ,
and (b) political interventions with day-to-day administrative work. This is
followed by the assessment of the tax administration’s revenue perform-
ance. The analysis shows that the donor-supported ZRA signiﬁcantly
reduced the inﬂuence of the neopatrimonial environment on central tax
collection. Yet creating this institutional ‘ island’ has been consistent with a
neopatrimonial rationale, as it left open other routes for neopatrimonial
practices and provided further resources for them.
Zambia’s tax administration as part of the state structure
After independence, the Zambian government faced the need to strengthen
the inadequate tax administration apparatus inherited from colonial rule.
In its ﬁrst report, the Department of Taxes noted that the government had
authorised 141 posts, of which 127 were ﬁlled. The Department dealt
with only 6,493 taxpayers at that time (DTZ 1969: 8). In common with
the rest of the civil service, President Kaunda’s UNIP government
massively expanded the Departments of Taxes and of Customs and Excise.
The number of staﬀ in the Department of Customs and Excise for instance
rose from 280 in the 1964 to 629 in 1967 alone (DCEZ 1966: 1).
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However, available evidence paints the picture of an increasingly ailing
administration. With the introduction of the one-party state in December
1972, Zambia’s administrative structure lost most of its operational
autonomy and had to predominantly follow a political logic. Goldsmith
(1999: 544) regards this as a general pattern for sub-Saharan Africa:
‘Political interference and low standards set the wrong tone at the begin-
ning and interacted later with poor working conditions and low pay in a
classic vicious circle. ’
Political and neopatrimonial considerations signiﬁcantly reduced the
merit orientation of tax oﬃcers. The heads of both Departments were
appointees with connections to the ruling party UNIP. According to a
long-serving tax oﬃcer, this form of selecting the tax administration’s
leadership was widely resented among tax oﬃcers. They saw the managers
as unqualiﬁed ‘outsiders ’ (14.4.2004 int.). Although technical qualiﬁ-
cations were not completely disregarded as a recruitment criterion, the
apparently best-suited candidates did not ﬁll the tax administration’s
leadership positions.15
Working for the tax administration was very unattractive, as the salary
levels were low and the employment conditions poor. By 1991, the real
remuneration for most public sector groups had declined to only 11–22%
of its 1975 value (World Bank 2003: 114). The fundamental reason could be
found in Zambia’s severe economic and ﬁscal crisis, which restricted the
state’s ability to remunerate its numerous civil servants properly. A second
reason was that, as in many African countries, high inﬂation rates eroded
more than 80% of the purchasing power of civil servants (van de Walle
2005: 78). According to an annual report from the Department of Taxes
(1987: 9), trained tax oﬃcers ‘ tend to leave for greener pastures largely
because they can be much better remunerated elsewhere or they stand
better chances of promotion in other government organs and hence get
higher pay’.
The logic of neopatrimonialism was also felt in the day-to-day
business of doing tax assessments and evaluating customs duties.
According to a former tax oﬃcer, ‘ some people had better treatment,
the big shots. It depended on who you are’ (14.4.2004 int.). This assertion
is also valid for the Department of Customs and Excise. In his 1979
annual report, the head of the department openly articulated his
frustration: ‘The number of senior people in the Party and its
Government who apparently feel they have immunity to Customs form-
alities continued to soar … Oﬃcers are now working under constant
fear of being victimised if they stumble across these oﬃcials ’ (DCEZ 1983:
6).16
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This neopatrimonial interference exerted strong eﬀects on the tax ad-
ministration’s revenue performance. In the beginning of the 1970s,
tax revenue amounted to about 30% of GDP, a value that was pre-
dominantly caused by the high copper price on the world markets
(Coopers & Lybrand 1992: par. 1). At that time, taxing the mines’ high
proﬁts was the major source of state income. After 1975, this ratio more
than halved and, in 1993 the year before the introduction of the semi-
autonomous ZRA, it amounted to only 15.3% (World Bank 2003: 15).
This could not only be attributed to Zambia’s economic crisis. A sig-
niﬁcant proportion of the tax potential remained uncollected. In 1992,
the minister of ﬁnance stated that the tax administration only tapped one
third of formal sector incomes (RoZ 1992: 19). As the government
refrained from capturing ‘diﬃcult ’ taxpayer groups with intimate con-
nections to the ruling elite, the Department of Taxes never managed to
signiﬁcantly broaden the tax base. Self-employed individuals such
as physicians and lawyers remained largely outside the tax net (DTZ
1976: 4).
Neopatrimonial interference with the recruitment of staﬀ and with
day-to-day operations were major factors causing the deﬁcits of Zambia’s
tax administration during the Second Republic. Neopatrimonialism
trickled down directly to the tax administration and reduced its per-
formance. As a result, the weak revenue collection authorities inherited
from colonial rule became largely dysfunctional during the Second
Republic.
Relationship to the donor community
Apparently, drawing on international aid was less ‘costly ’ for the UNIP
government than taxing its citizens. From 1975 to the present day, Zambia
has received large amounts of foreign donor assistance, both in absolute
terms and relative to GDP. Up to 2001, donors in toto provided more than
US$12 billion of ﬁnancial assistance to Zambia, equivalent to almost 20%
of GDP (McPherson 2004a: 446; World Bank 2005). With 14.4% of the
Gross National Income coming from oﬃcial development assistance in
2005, Zambia is still heavily reliant on external ﬁnancial support (OECD
2007). In April 2005, the IMF and the World Bank under their Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative formally endorsed a US$
3.9 billion debt relief for Zambia (IMF 2005b). Following the June 2005
commitment of developed countries to write oﬀ bilateral debt, the
Minister of Finance and National Planning expected Zambia’s foreign
debt to decline to US$300–500 million by May 2006 (The Post 3.1.2006).
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However, despite strong dependence on external ﬁnancing, structural
conditions attached to loans were not implemented. During the two
decades of one-party rule, the UNIP government failed to meet the
conditions of seven formal adjustment programmes negotiated with
international donors (McPherson 2004b: 31). The government’s com-
mitment to structural reforms of the economy and the state apparatus
was ‘ lukewarm’ (Bratton 1994: 107), as illustrated by its half-hearted
implementation eﬀorts. This repeatedly led to arrears in loan repayments
and breakdowns in international loan agreements. As aﬃrmed by many
scholars, ﬁnancial reforms proved to be politically unsustainable (Bates &
Collier 1995: 135, 141 ; Bratton 1994: 107; Callaghy 1990: 294). Following
Rakner (2003: 58), the development was characterised by ‘ the national
leadership’s insistence on setting political survival needs before economic
survival ’. Furthermore, the donor community implemented only weak
sanctions for Zambia’s non-compliance. In essence, ﬁnancial donor aid
proved to be more easily available and at least partly acted as a surrogate
for domestic revenue generation.
The picture changed completely after the regime transition in late 1991.
The newly elected MMD government not only swiftly liberalised
Zambia’s ﬁscal and economic policy (e.g. Craig 2001 ; Rakner 2003), but
also negotiated new loan agreements with the donor community. In
the face of the experiences with the start-stop approach towards the
implementation of conditionalities in the 1980s, the IMF made
the strengthening of internal revenue collection a precondition for the
provision of new loans (Gloppen & Rakner 2002: 32; Hill 2004: 141). This
was of crucial importance, as the route of de facto unconditionally ﬁnancing
the state through external funds was now closed. Reform of the tax
administration had become inevitable for strengthening both internal and
external state revenue.
Reform amidst Zambia’s neopatrimonial environment
In 1992, the British government funded initial studies, which re-
commended the establishment of a semi-autonomous revenue auth-
ority (Coopers & Lybrand 1992; Gray et al. 2001).17 The arguments for
taking the revenue generation out of Zambia’s core state structure
were two-fold. The ﬁrst was to increase revenue performance through
the business-like collection of taxes (see in general Devas et al. 2001).
The second was to insulate the tax administration from Zambia’s
neopatrimonial environment, i.e. from political interference (TPTF
1992: 4).
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The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), replacing the ministerial
Departments of Taxes and Customs & Excise, started to operate on 1 April
1994. Its executive commissioner general is appointed by the Zambian
president, and alone is responsible for the collection of central state taxes.
He or she reports to a nine-member Governing Board and not to the
Ministry of Finance and National Planning (RoZ 1996: sec. 10 (1), (3)).
The creation of the ZRA was also in the interest of the new Zambian
government. Like other institutional innovations created in the ‘honey-
moon period’ of the Chiluba government, the revenue authority acted as a
forceful symbol of its commitment to turn Zambia’s public administration
around. The addressees of this visible ‘reform barometer ’ were both the
Zambian population and the donor community.18
Strong expatriate management and merit orientation of staﬀ
The ZRA has been a reform project closely monitored by donors. Until
2004, the British Department for International Development (DFID)
provided technical assistance worth £15.8 million to the project.19 The
most prominent aspect was the provision of an expatriate management
team for the ZRA. In the beginning, none of the authority’s four most
senior managers was Zambian. Three commissioners, including the
Commissioner General, were from the United Kingdom and one was
from Tanzania.
Foreign personnel were thought to be less responsive to Zambia’s neo-
patrimonial environment (Delay et al. 1999: 23 ; Gray & Chapman 2001:
40; Kasanga 1996: 21). According to Donald Chanda (22.4.2004 int.), the
long-serving economic advisor to President Chiluba, ‘ it was a deliberate
policy to have top managers paid by DFID. It was a very important in-
ﬂuence to de-link Commissioners from local politics ’. Only in February
2002, almost nine years after the creation of the tax agency, did the
expatriate Commissioner General, the last manager from abroad, leave, to
be succeeded by a Zambian. The donors’ strategy therefore was to insulate
the revenue authority from its neopatrimonial environment by bringing in
foreign managers.
The ZRA’s local managers maintain close connections to the political
sphere (Gloppen & Rakner 2002: 34). The intimate exchange became
obvious when a dismissed commissioner of customs directly appealed to
the president and was reinstated following pressure from the Presidency
(Times of Zambia 20.5.2004, 25.5.2004). Furthermore, in early 2007,
President Mwanawasa, and not the ZRA’s Governing Board, terminated
the contract of the Commissioner General (Times of Zambia 3.1.2007).
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Although politicians do not openly interfere with the recruitment process
as seems to be the case in other countries ’ revenue authorities (for Uganda
see Therkildsen 2004: 73), a high number of ZRA employees feel that
politics are involved in the appointment of senior managers. Even one
member of the ZRA’s Governing Board agreed that ‘a lot of them have
access to politicians’ (26.5.2004 int.). However, on the whole, the ZRA has
brought a signiﬁcant increase in the qualiﬁcation of tax administration
managers. The neopatrimonial environment today exerts less inﬂuence on
them than under the old dispensation.
The lack of merit orientation among low-level and middle-level staﬀ
had been one of the main deﬁcits of the former tax administration.
In contrast, the ZRA pursues its own recruitment policy, thereby cir-
cumventing the Public Service Commission which is responsible for the
rest of Zambia’s civil service (see in general Devas et al. 2001 : 214). Before
the revenue authority was launched, every civil servant had to reapply in
order to be employed by the new institution. The revenue authority only
took over the best-qualiﬁed oﬃcers, who had not been involved in corrupt
activities.
Later, the management introduced minimum qualiﬁcations, meaning
that every middle-level tax oﬃcer must hold a diploma or higher univer-
sity degree. This entrance barrier has been of crucial importance for the
ZRA’s merit orientation: managers can resist the recruitment of unquali-
ﬁed staﬀ due to neopatrimonial pressures. Accordingly, ZRA employees
overwhelmingly perceive the recruitment process for low- and middle-
level tax oﬃcers to be transparent and fair. The view of one oﬃcer from
the Taxes Division is exemplary: ‘First and foremost you have to be
qualiﬁed. There is a minimum threshold for the aptitude test. If you
can’t score the threshold you can be the nephew of someone from 9th
ﬂoor – too bad’ (23.3.2004 int.).20 This perception was mirrored by
respondents from outside Zambia’s tax administration.
The ZRA has largely de-linked the employment of administrative staﬀ
from Zambia’s neopatrimonial environment. This is despite the fact that
Zambia’s political actors have continuously made use of neopatrimonial
practices apart from the revenue authority. The prime actors setting the
ZRA’s foundations were, however, expatriate and not local. In this regard,
the revenue authority for a long time was an ‘exterritorial ’ organisation.
Furthermore, there are ﬁrst indications that the ZRA has lost its special
status with the phasing out of DFID’s direct assistance in 2005. From
1998 to 2003, the authority had received higher funds from Zambia’s
government than accounted for in the respective budgets. The govern-
ment ceased this funding facility in 2004 (Zambia Daily Mail 19.4.2004). An
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oﬃcial from the Ministry of Finance and National Planning explained the
change of government policy: ‘ It is just a government organisation we
can’t treat them diﬀerently or give them huge amounts ’ (25.3.2004 int.).
The 2002 government funding for the ZRA was K7 billion short of the
amount expected. As a consequence, the agency ran a deﬁcit of K5.7
billion in its operational budget (ZRA 1999: 24).
In explaining the ZRA’s funding problems in recent years, various
government oﬃcials pointed to the ﬁnancial crisis of the Zambian state
and to the tight budget conditionalities set out for attaining the completion
point of the HIPC initiative. In contrast, ZRA employees (mostly from the
low and middle level) and several respondents from outside the authority
believed that the funding problems have been related to the exit of the
expatriate Commissioner General on 31 January 2002, and the takeover
of a Zambian national. A ZRA manager articulated this concern by
maintaining that ‘ there is something unspoken. We are being punished.
The minute a Zambian was appointed it changed’ (7.4.2004 int.).
The expatriate management was strongly supported by DFID.
According to a former Commissioner General, at times he indeed re-
ported to the British ambassador or the local IMF Representative, in order
to protect the interests of the ZRA vis-a`-vis political actors. This external
control has been much weaker for the Zambian Commissioner General
whose salary is not ﬁnanced by DFID. As the ZRA has lost much of
its ‘exterritorial ’ status, the political environment is now able to exert
‘a lot more pressure ’ on the ZRA, stated a former Commissioner General
(16.8.2004 int.). This points to the crucial importance of donor inﬂuence
in pressuring for the ZRA operating along rational-legal lines, and in
preserving the authority’s special status. The sustainability of this external
intervention is currently under threat.
Restricted interference with day-to-day business
Despite donor surveillance and general government support, it appears
that in various instances taxpayers have received preferential treatment
whereas others have been harassed.21 This indicates some neopatrimonial
inﬂuence on the ZRA’s day-to-day business of assessing tax liabilities.
At least in the beginning, prominent MMD politicians and their
businesses were not controlled through tax audits (Kasanga 1996: 23).
A common phrase employees heard from their managers in these cases
was ‘don’t go to this man, this man is diﬃcult ’. Respondents mentioned
several politician-owned companies which allegedly have never paid tax.
Furthermore, the ZRA was apparently told not to control ‘ special ’
T A X CO L L E C T I O N I N Z AM B I A 635
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Jan 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
government members for dutiable goods at border posts. A customs oﬃcer
working at Chirundu border post maintained: ‘That’s how the system is –
they make an independent ZRA and [then] break the rules ’ (20.5.2004
int.).
On the other hand, the Chiluba government used arbitrary tax
auditing and ﬁnes as a means of pursuing an ‘almost irrational beha-
viour … towards outspoken NGOs’ (Erdmann & Simutanyi 2003: 42).
For example, in 2003 it set bailiﬀs on the organisation Afronet for tax
evasion. Seven cars and other property were seized (ibid. : 57). One
prominent member of the Zambian NGO Forum for Democratic Process
(FODEP) reported a similar incident. According to him, the organisation
did not have any tax arrears, which makes this measure arbitrary
(26.4.2004 int.). It was only following donor pressure that seized FODEP
money was released.
This suggests that taxation in the Third Republic in some cases has been
used for harassment of opponents or the provision of unlawful beneﬁts to
government members. In general, however, the government has limited
undue inﬂuence on the revenue authority’s day-to-day business, compared
with its predecessor institutions. Aﬃrmed by most respondents, even from
civil society, instances of positive or negative discrimination have – at least
in the recent years – not been of a systematic nature.
Increased but stagnating revenue performance
The restriction of neopatrimonial interference has resulted in improved
revenue performance. The tax-to-GDP ratio went up sharply from 15.3%
to 18.7% in the ﬁrst year of ZRA’s operation (World Bank 2003: 15) ; total
revenue collected increased by 61% in the same period (Kasanga 1996:
17). This tax-to-GDP ratio is above the regional average of 15.6% for 2003
(World Bank 2003: 14, sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa). In the
following years, however, the tax take has largely remained stagnant
at around 17% (see Table 1). At least in the beginning, economic devel-
opment, tax policy and tax exemptions were contributory factors causing
this stagnation. Until the end of the 1990s, Zambia experienced an econ-
omic downturn, which reduced the tax take (Gray et al. 2001: 2, 11).
The loss-making Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) was a
burden rather than a contributor to state revenue. Following a lengthy and
contentious process, ZCCM was ﬁnally privatised and removed from
state coﬀers in 2000 (Craig 2001). Other parastatals such as the national
electricity utility ZESCO amounted large tax arrears (World Bank 2003:
16, 43).
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Tax rates and customs duties were lowered in order to induce economic
growth. The highest income tax rate today stands at 37.5%; company tax
is levied at 15% on farming, 35% on manufacturing and 40% on banks
(PWC 2006). Tax exemptions were a further drain for revenue: at its peak
in 1998, the government had granted tax exemptions to 500 corporations
(Gray et al. 2001: 22). The widespread exemption of the copper industry
from taxation, for instance, meant that the Zambian state hardly partici-
pated in the high world copper prices of 2004 and 2005 (IMF 2006a: 11).22
In the beginning, the major factors depressing the tax-to-GDP ratio
therefore lay beyond the revenue authority’s inﬂuence.
Yet, despite an average annual growth rate of 4.4% since 2000
(IMF 2005a: 55), the tax-to-GDP ratio has remained stagnant. This
cannot be attributed only to the provision of tax exemptions. Some
administrative weaknesses in recent years, possibly connected to the
decreasing ‘exterritorial ’ status of the ZRA, must also account for
the stagnating revenue performance. This development augments the
argument made that the sustainability of the tax administration reform
project in Zambia is under threat. This initial upward movement in
revenue performance followed by stagnation or even decline has been a
characteristic feature of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in Africa
(Fjeldstad & Rakner 2003: 17 ; Gray & Chapman 2001: 26).
At least in the Zambian case, this can primarily be attributed to the
small tax base the ZRA collects from. The authority and the government
have largely desisted from the administratively and politically demanding
task of expanding direct taxation (Gray et al. 2001: 12). Direct taxes have
never amounted to more than 8% of GDP (see Table 1). For a long time,
the government refrained from creating special tax instruments, such as a
‘presumptive tax’ for Zambia’s huge informal sector. Only with the 2003
T A B L E 1
Revenue performance indicators Zambia
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Tax revenue 19.0 18.8 18.1 17.2 19.2 18.6 17.5 17.3 17.5 17.0 16.2
Income taxes 5.6 5.8 6.3 6.5 6.3 7.5 7.6 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.6
Sales tax/VAT 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.0
Trade taxes 6.1 5.6 4.7 2.4 3.4 4.1 5.1 5.1 5.6 5.1 4.2
Notes : In per cent of GDP. Zambia’s tax year begins at 1 January and ends at 31 December. Trade
taxes include sales tax/VAT on imported goods. Data for 2005 are preliminary, for 2006 are pro-
jected.
Sources : 1996-2002: IMF (2004: 35), 2003-06: IMF (2006b: 22).
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budget did the minister of Finance and National Planning announce that
small-scale traders, marketers, unregistered mini-taxis and rental income
would increasingly be targeted for taxation (RoZ 2003: 14). In 2004
he introduced a presumptive tax of 3% for businesses with an annual
turnover of K200 million and below (RoZ 2004a: 19). Its signiﬁcance has
however remained modest.23
It appears that political interests meet administrative interests in
this case. The donor-supported revenue authority operates in line with
business principles, and strongly focuses on revenue performance as the
measure of success. The eﬀort needed to raise a high amount of taxes
from large registered businesses is lower than from the dispersed informal
sector. Accordingly, the ZRA and other revenue authorities in Africa have
not shown much interest in making the eﬀort to tap these revenue sources
(Fjeldstad 2005: 3; Gloppen & Rakner 2002: 37). The Zambian govern-
ment, for its part, has an interest in not taxing too strongly large parts of
the electorate, who are found in the informal sector. Felix Mutati, then
the deputy minister of ﬁnance and national planning, agreed that the
Zambian government is wary of taxing this section of the economy: ‘every
government in the world reacts to the retention in oﬃce’ (20.4.2004 int.).
With formal sector employment accounting for less than 20% of Zambia’s
economically active population (CSO 1999: 40), the burden of income tax
falls on the few individuals working for large companies or the public
service.
: : :
The three features ‘concentration of political power’, ‘award of personal
favours ’, and ‘misuse of state resources ’ reveal a striking continuity of
neopatrimonial practice despite Zambia’s regime transition in 1991. In
spite of this neopatrimonial stability, the semi-autonomous ZRA has
brought a signiﬁcant increase in revenue performance. At about 17% of
GDP, a larger part of state revenue today comes from domestic sources
than under the old administrative structure.
In the African context, donors perceive the ZRA as a successful tax
administration reform project (Gray & Chapman 2001). On the whole, the
Zambian government has sustained the ZRA’s independent position. It
seems to interfere less with the ZRA’s operations than other governments
with their revenue authorities (for Uganda see Therkildsen 2004).
Neopatrimonial and political demands can still be fulﬁlled through tax
exemptions and the de facto non-taxation of the informal sector. Available
evidence also suggests that the collection of non-tax revenue and service
638 CHR I S T I AN VON SOE S T
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 13 Jan 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.4
charges by other institutions is still characterised by ineﬀectiveness and the
provision of political favours (cf. Burnell 2001a: 46–7). This demonstrates
that the ZRA has limited neopatrimonial practices in relation to the col-
lection of central state taxes only.
In other areas of the state, Zambia’s political actors pursue neopa-
trimonial exchange relations largely unabatedly. Government members
still satisfy particularistic demands through the expenditure side of the
budget. As outlined, donor reports have repeatedly criticised the lack of
budget discipline and the continued misuse of state resources (World Bank
2003, 2004; see also Burnell 2001a). In conjunction with strong donor
oversight, the speciﬁc eﬀects of Zambia’s neopatrimonialism on the col-
lection of domestic state revenue have changed, but neopatrimonialism
has not vanished.
It can even be argued that the strengthened revenue generation func-
tion has provided additional funds for neopatrimonial practices, i.e. has
increased them on the whole. This would amount to an unintended
consequence of this technical donor intervention project. Following the
argument, donors have overlooked the fact that limiting neopa-
trimonialism on the revenue side through ‘their ’ ZRA as a strong formal
institution, does not equal controlling neopatrimonialism completely. In
the same vein, a former ZRA top manager stated with reference to
President Chiluba that ‘ it was in his interest to have a strong ZRA, to get
money in’.24 This reasoning ﬁts well into other literature hypothesising
that ‘new, relatively powerful Revenue Authorities that aid donors have
been helping to establish in Africa have become major conduits for ac-
cumulating and channelling unrecorded revenues in wrong hands’
(Moore & Rakner 2002: 7).
Furthermore, the revenue authority has lost its special, donor-supported
status. As a consequence of the DFID’s exit in 2005 and the take-over of a
Zambian management team, external actors have a declining leverage in
pressuring for a well-funded and rational-legal tax administration.
Funding problems and stagnating revenue performance in recent years
are ﬁrst indications that the sustainability of this donor intervention is
under threat.
The reform of the tax administration in Zambia appears to be a typical
example of the ‘partial reform syndrome’ (for Africa, see van de Walle
2001a: 60–3; for Zambia, see Rakner 2003: 168), meaning that political
leaders only carry out reforms which do not hurt their vested interests. By
strengthening tax administration, donors have provided more resources to
Zambia’s political actors. At the same time, expenditure management
has remained largely ineﬀective. The ZRA’s larger consequences for
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neopatrimonialism may therefore have been detrimental to its original
intentions.
N O T E S
1. In this article, the terms ‘ taxes ’ and ‘revenue’ encompass income taxes, value-added taxes and
customs duties.
2. Posner & Simon (2002: 331) portray Zambia as a ‘modal case’ in the African context.
3. The respondents were tax oﬃcers from (a) the management and (b) middle/low hierarchy levels,
business persons, civil society representatives, politicians and policy-makers, social scientists and em-
ployees from international organisations. Field work was conducted from 4 March to 27 May 2004.
Research permission granted by the Zambia Revenue Authority is greatly acknowledged. In order to
protect the respondents cited in this article, most of their names are made anonymous. A list of all
respondents and the transcripts of the interviews are ﬁled on CD ROM and can be obtained from the
author on request.
4. Detailed and insightful accounts on the collection of these forms of revenue can be found in
Burnell (2001a), and the reports from the World Bank (2003) and Transparency International Zambia
(TIZ 2003).
5. For an extensive discussion of the neopatrimonialism concept see Erdmann & Engel (2007).
6. This article understands every policy or political action which violates the rational-legal logic of
the tax administration and the administrative chain of command as ‘ interference’.
7. Bratton & van de Walle (1997) term this feature ‘presidentialism’. However, this is misleading as
the traditional political science deﬁnition of presidentialism refers to political systems in which the
president is directly elected by the electorate, exerts executive power and cannot be deselected by
parliament (in contrast to parliamentary systems) (Schmidt 2000: 309–10). This article therefore refers
to the phenomenon in question as ‘concentration of political power’.
8. Article 35 (2) of the 1991/1996 Constitution (Roz 2004b) today restricts the tenure of oﬃce of the
president to the maximum of two ﬁve-year terms. Hence, in Zambia’s multi-party ‘Third Republic’
the president is eligible for one re-election only. This term limit was contested in 2000 when some
quarters in the ruling party MMD – apparently backed by the president – tried to amend the consti-
tution in order to allow for a third term of President Chiluba. Only after massive public protests was
this exercise stopped (Rakner & Sva˚sand 2005: 97; Rakner 2003: 114). These manoeuvres strengthen
the case made in this article for a neopatrimonial power concentration in Zambia.
9. Key ministers include the vice-president/prime minister and the ministers of ﬁnance, foreign
aﬀairs, defence and interior. Under President Kaunda, the average tenure was 2.4 years, under
President Chiluba 2.7 years and under PresidentMwanawasa (up to the year 2005) 1.6 years. Due to the
comparatively short endurance of the Mwanawasa presidency, the ﬁgures give only ﬁrst indications
about big man rule trends in his administration. Sources: 1964–69: The Statesman’s Year Book
1964–1970; 1970–2005: Africa South of the Sahara 1971–2005.
10. Totals include presidents and vice-presidents, but not deputy ministers, permanent secretaries
and provincial governors. The data on Cabinet size were mostly derived from the months August and
September of the respective years. Sources: 1964–69: The Statesman’s Year Book (Macmillan 1964–70),
1970–2005: Africa South of the Sahara (Europa Publications 1971–2004; Routledge 2005).
11. In assessing the average number of cabinet members for sub-Saharan Africa, van de Walle
(2005) systematically excluded ‘heads of states ’. For comparability to this article’s ﬁgures, one post was
added to his average data, respectively.
12. Well-researched examples can be found in Szeftel (1982; 2000) and Bratton & Posner (1999:
393–8).
13. In addition to the general problem of sources, it is diﬃcult to precisely compare the misuse of
state resources between the Kaunda and Chiluba administrations, as these instances of neopatrimonial
politics have been more easily uncovered in the multiparty Third Republic which allows for stronger
civil society, media and donor oversight than the Second Republic. The common perception that
misuse of state resources was more rampant under President Chiluba’s rule may therefore be an
artefact caused by the diﬀerent quality of sources.
14. See also the practice of authorising substantial ‘ supplementary appropriations ’ for the
Ministries of Home Aﬀairs, Defence, Foreign Aﬀairs, Finance and Labour. Under Zambia’s budget
regulations, these expenses are determined by the executive alone, with the Ministry of Finance and
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National Planning having up to 15 months after the end of the ﬁscal year to table the supplementary
appropriations bill before parliament (World Bank 2003: 28–30). The World Bank report (2003: 28)
concludes: ‘Zambia’s constitutional provisions for Supplementary Estimates are extremely
lax – instead of encouraging democratic accountability, they undermine it. ’
15. This mix of partly adhering to qualiﬁcations in a rational-legal sense, and of patrimonial
and political logics involved in ﬁlling management positions provides evidence for the existence of
neopatrimonialism understood as the simultaneous operation of a patrimonial and rational-legal logic
in the tax administration (see deﬁnition at the beginning of the article).
16. The regular occurrence of these interventions was conﬁrmed by nearly all of the 75 respondents,
i.e. tax oﬃcers, business persons, civil society representatives, policy-makers, social scientists and em-
ployees from international organisations, who have knowledge on Zambia’s former, state-integrated
tax administration.
17. The conceptual impetus was provided by the paradigm of New Public Management
which promotes the creation of semi-autonomous agencies and the application of business-sector
principles such as performance-related salaries for the public administration (Hood 1990). The
worldwide diﬀusion of New Public Management has been of increasing relevance to the African
state. Today, at least eight revenue authorities can be found in sub-Saharan Africa (Devas et al. 2001:
213).
18. For a general analysis of the Zambian government’s two-level game between internal and
external actors during the Third Republic, see Rakner (2003: esp. 174–89).
19. In 1994, the responsible British Ministry was named ‘Overseas Development Administration’ ;
since 1997 it has operated under the name ‘Department for International Development’ (DFID).
The scope of the DFID intervention expanded considerably beyond mere support of the ZRA.
Since 2000, DFID has also supported the Tax Policy Unit within Zambia’s Ministry of Finance
and National Planning, and has assisted local NGOs to build knowledge on taxation issues.
Therefore, the sum was not completely awarded to the ZRA. Interview, DFID Manager, Lusaka,
11.3.2004.
20. The ZRA’s management is based on the 9th ﬂoor of the headquarters in Lusaka.
21. There was no other question to which respondents gave such disparate answers. While the ZRA
management claimed that there is no political interference, some employees on the low/middle level
as well as NGO representatives strongly maintained that there has been selective application of the tax
code in Zambia.
22. From 2002 to 2006, the Zambian state collected US$71.5 million as tax from all mines over a
period of ﬁve years. This was realised in the form of company tax, withholding tax, dividends and
mineral royalties. Overall, this translates into a tax rate of only 11% on the mines’ proﬁts (Times of
Zambia 22.2.2007).
23. At this point it must be noted that the informal sector consists not only of impoverished
people but also of a considerable number of wealthy business persons, e.g. consultants and other self-
employed individuals, often with political connections, who opt to stay outside the tax system
altogether (on taxing the informal sector, see Ge¨rxhani 2004).
24. The details of this respondent were made completely anonymous.
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